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It has become popular to advocate partnership arrangements. Such partnerships may be seen as
new forms of governance, which fit in with the imminent network society. However, the idea of
partnership is often introduced without much reflection on the need to reorganize policy-making
processes and to adjust existing institutional structures.
In this contribution, we discuss the ambiguity of partnerships. An empirical basis is provided by
means of an analysis of the policy making on the expansion of the Rotterdam harbor. This case
indicates that although new governance schemes are being proposed and explored, they still have
to comply with the existing procedures in which they are imbedded. Governments especially are
not prepared to adjust to governance arrangements. Policy making continues to be based on self-
referential organizational decisions, rather than on joint interorganizational policy making. This
raises questions about the added value of intended cooperative governance processes.
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Looking for New Forms of
Interorganizational Governance
The involvement of all kinds of organizations in joint
decision making has received a great deal of attention lately.
This search for cooperation can be seen in all domains of
societal decision making: between government organiza-
tions, between government and citizens, and, more recently,
also between government organizations and private-sector
organizations. Intergovernmental interaction has been the
subject of a number of studies on planning and decision
making (Mayntz and Scharpf 1973; Rhodes 1996). While
interactive decision making was also one of the main top-
ics of the 1990s (Daemen and Schaap 2000). Public–pri-
vate partnerships are gaining support as new forms of gov-
ernance (Osborne 2000).
This call for governance, cooperation, and partnerships,
however, does not directly lead to major shifts in day-to-
day decision making. Partnership projects are not easy to
realize. Verbally, much has been made of the potential ben-
efits of cooperation. The term “partnership” has clearly
penetrated the language games played by politicians and
governors. For instance, the Labour prime minister of Great
Britain, Tony Blair, and his Cabinet have frequently re-
ferred to “partnerships” when implementing their policies.
The partnership concept stands for the New Labour, which
works with society rather than directing it from above.
Partnership gives the government a new legitimacy: the
efficiency of the private sector and the involvement of civil
society (for partnerships, New Labour, and contradictions,
see Falconer and McLaughlin 2000).
However, looking more concretely at everyday reality,
we find there seems to be a scarcity of projects set up jointly
by public and private actors. For instance, the well-known
Public Finance Initiative in the United Kingdom, set up by
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public actors, is a contracting-out scheme rather than a
partnership (for the distinction between contracting-out and
partnerships, see Klijn and Teisman 2000). In the Nether-
lands, we see only a few cases where we can really speak
of a public–private partnership. And even in several of the
so-called Partnerships Key Projects that have been adopted
by the Partnerships Center of the Ministry of Finance, one
may question the level of partnership.
While there is an intensified interaction between public
and private partners, there is little joint decision making
and continuity in cooperation. In fact, the use of the term
“partnership” does not immediately imply a change from
unilateral to joint decision making, as opposed to experi-
ences in the private sector, where many joint ventures and
strategic alliances have actually been established (Faulkner
1995; Böttcher 1995)
In this article, we explore the factors that account for
the gap between dream and reality with regard to part-
nership as a governance scheme. Our insights and con-
clusions are based on an analysis of a prominent case in
the Netherlands: the planning and decision making of
Mainport Rotterdam, one of the leading harbors in the
world. Due to the globalization of the production chains
of many firms, the amount of goods transports world-
wide is growing. In 1995, Mainport Rotterdam handled
some five million containers; in 2020, this will be at least
10 million and possibly more than 15 million. This raises
the question of how to deal with this growth. In terms of
economy, many stakeholders are in favor of growth and,
therefore, advocate reserving additional space reserva-
tions for new industrial areas. This, however, implies the
realization of a new polder in the river delta and partly in
the North Sea. This solution has been questioned, not just
by various environmental groups, but also by public au-
thorities responsible for spatial planning. Even some of
the economy-oriented actors are not in favor of expand-
ing the port, questioning the added value of the tradi-
tional transport sector. All the critics advocate shifting
from a “mainport” to a so-called “brainport.”
Before discussing this case (section 3) and the lessons
we can learn from it (section 4) in more detail, we will
first address the reasons for the rise in pleas for partner-
ships. Partnerships in general and public–private partner-
ships in particular can be seen as new governance schemes,
which aim to manage the increased interdependencies be-
tween all kinds of societal actors. The partnership concept
may be linked to the trend toward network forms of gover-
nance, in which public actors take their interdependencies
with other actors into account and try to solve governance
problems through cooperation rather than through central
steering and control (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987;
Sinnig 1995; McCarthy 1998).
The Need for Governance Schemes
Despite the problems they entail, public–private partner-
ships are pointed out as worthwhile schemes over and over
again. Partnerships are seen as the best way, in the end, to
govern the complex relations and interactions in a modern
network society. As an argument in favor of public–private
partnerships it is said that the intertwining of the public and
private sectors calls for new forms of governance (Castells
1996). We will elaborate on this argument.
Beyond Markets and Hierarchies:
A Theory of Cooperation
We assume that the classic separation between market
and hierarchy or between public and private sector is dis-
appearing. The validity of this assumption can be illus-
trated in many ways. The first one that springs to mind is
the fact that public and private actors are becoming in-
creasingly dependent on each other. This has been shown
in recent theoretical and empirical work on governance
and also by the discussion on the public–private distinc-
tion (Marsh and Rhodes 1992; Kickert, Klijn, and
Koppenjan 1997).
But one can also observe that the organizational mecha-
nisms that are traditionally labeled as part of either the pub-
lic or the private sector (and are often at the same time la-
beled as hierarchy and market) are changing. Competition
has become part of government regimes, and cooperation
and coordination have become a part of network manage-
ment in the private sector (Böttcher 1995). Firms are oper-
ating within “industrial networks,” where they depend on a
range of other firms for the manufacturing and sale of their
products. Within these networks, firms seem to rely on forms
of relational contracting rather than on simple market trans-
actions, or on hierarchically internalizing activities as sur-
vival strategies. There is a growing body of literature that
tries to account for these developing relations between firms
and addresses the question of how these industrial networks
function and what advantages they have to offer (Miles and
Snow 1986; Hakansson and Johansson 1993; Lundvall 1993;
Alter and Hage 1993). It is stated that interorganizational
chains and networks are a reaction to the rising expectations
and demands of clients (Martin 1994; Ohmae 1994).
In fact, governments are faced with the same develop-
ments in society. They are also becoming more and more
dependent on private and semiprivate actors for implement-
ing their policies. In this respect, we may say that govern-
mental organizations and actors are functioning in similar
networks (see the large body of literature on this topic:
Hanf and Scharpf 1978; Rhodes 1988; Marsh and Rhodes
1992; Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan 1997; Teisman 2001).
This makes the implementation of policies and projects a
complex issue, requiring cooperation with various actors.
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The Governance Debate as a Twofold
Question: Why Needed and Why Not
Established
There is, however, a major difference between the pub-
lic and the private sector. The public sector is based, to a
far greater extent, on hierarchical demand mechanisms
that are controlled by the top administrators and politi-
cians. They can define demands of society on an aggre-
gated level without the need to trace this demand back to
individual demands. It may be argued that many of the
hierarchical mechanisms in the public sector do not fit in
well with situations in which the government has to
achieve its goals. Implementation problems are legend-
ary (see the classic Pressman and Wildavsky 1984). At
the same time, however, the government is unwilling to
abandon its formal superior position, mainly because hi-
erarchy is the only representative democracy model we
are familiar with that has shown its quality. And due to a
lack of alternatives, governments and politicians tend to
adhere to the formal procedures based on principles of
hierarchy. Within this hierarchy, it is the politicians who
impose the demands, not society. This diagnosis brings
us to a twofold question: The first refers to the need of
new theories and practices in terms of governance arrange-
ments, and the second refers to the need for theories about
the inability to establish new governance arrangements.
By dealing with these two questions at the same time, we
are able to better understand the splits that many govern-
ments find themselves in.
• If markets increasingly resemble networks, and if gov-
ernmental agencies have also become increasingly de-
pendent on network cooperation for their own efficiency
and effectiveness in meeting societal demands, what
does this imply for governance schemes in terms of
partnership relations? What could these new schemes
look like?
• If, however, governments continue to stick to their tradi-
tional procedures based on hierarchy and the primacy of
politics as the best representative arrangement we have
in Western society, what then are the chances of success
for partnership schemes? Can we think of effective com-
binations of partnership and hierarchy?
To deal with these two questions, we will start our argu-
mentation and exploration with statements that have been
made recently about network society and network man-
agement (Castells 1996; Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan
1997; Teisman 2001). We postulate three features that
should be incorporated into theorizing about the imple-
mentation of new governance schemes:
1. The achievement of the goals of each individual actor
requires activities by the other actors; mutual adjust-
ment is an important prerequisite.
2. The knowledge and resources necessary for achieving
the desired outcome are distributed among different ac-
tors. The importance of resources is not a given, but
depends on the value attributed by others (Scharpf 1978,
1997). Moral support, for instance, seems to have be-
come an important resource in decision making. The
scattered control of various resources creates a “world
in which nobody is in charge” (Bryson and Crosby 1992,
VI).
3. Complexity is a result of the interaction and negotia-
tion processes between different actors, whose resources
are indispensable for a joint undertaking. All these ac-
tors bring their own perceptions and strategies (Lissack
and Gunz 1999; Teisman 2000; Klijn, Koppenjan, and
Termeer 1995).
A crucial question now is how organizations in general
and governments in particular will cope with these develop-
ments. We assume the perceptions and interpretations of these
developments are the main factors that predict government’s
reactions. It may, for instance, be assumed that if complexity
(several actors involved, a variety of resources that should be
combined, and a variety of perceptions and solutions) is seen
as a threat by governmental organizations and politicians, pro-
posed partnership arrangements are likely to be quickly trans-
formed into traditional contracting-out schemes. In contract-
ing-out schemes, the government can go on using its existing,
well-established procedures of internal decision making. The
interaction with the private sector can be defined in terms of a
principal–agent relation. The government decides what it
wants and the private sector decides what it can deliver and at
what price.
The insights resulting from our search into the way gov-
ernments deal with the partnership phenomenon can be
summarized as follows:
• The establishment of network society and, more specifi-
cally, the rising expectations on the part of citizens chal-
lenge the existing processes of decision making, both in
terms of participation and quality of the outcome
(Castells 1996; Teisman 2001).
• In response to the rising expectations, the private sector
has become more consumer oriented and, as a result,
numerous interorganizational production chains, alli-
ances, and partnerships have been established
(Hoogervorst, 1998).
• Due to the different way that demands are defined in the
public sector, governments have only recently begun to
talk about and carry out experiments with cooperation
and partnership.
• These same governments, however, still seem to be dedi-
cated to their own procedures, rules, and principle of
control; for this reason, they try to fit partnerships into
the mold of traditional policy-making procedures.
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• If governments do not appreciate the complexity that
partnerships entail, in the end they will probably opt
for traditional contracting-out schemes, despite all the
rhetoric about partnerships and third ways (Giddens
1998).
These steps of reasoning can fit into a scheme that de-
picts the societal development that the private and public
sectors are facing and the two different responses that can
be foreseen, based on the perception governments have of
the phenomena of complexity.
In the next section, we will present empirical material
to elaborate on the question of the choice governments
make with respect to complexity and governance arrange-
ments such as partnerships. The case affirms statements
often made that processes are becoming more complex due
to societal demands. These demands are no longer repre-
sented by a single governmental organization. A whole
ecology of governmental organizations, as well as eco-
nomic, social, and environmental groups, are seen as im-
portant as representatives (though not elected in the tradi-
tional sense) of societal needs and ambitions. The
participation of all these organizations complicates policy-
making processes.
The case also indicates that public authorities have rec-
ognized the phenomenon of rising demand. They also rec-
ognize the need for support from others, which, in turn,
will create new and complex arrangements and processes.
Therefore, the first part of our train of thought, illustrated
in scheme 1, seems to be valid. The key question is to what
extent governments are ready and able to deal with this
complexity. The case clearly indicates that the demands
imposed upon governments by society call for partnerships
to be established. The case also indicates that existing gov-
ernmental procedures and positions still force all three iden-
tified types of partnership arrangements (intergovernmen-
tal, citizen participation, and public–private partnership)
back into traditional arrangements such as division of tasks,
hearings, and contracting out.
Complex Policy Making with Regard to
the Mainport Rotterdam
The Rotterdam Harbor developed rapidly after the Sec-
ond World War. In the period of reconstruction, from 1945
until the early 1980s, the development of the harbor was
not under discussion. It was seen as a keystone of eco-
nomic development. The policy-making process was not
complicated by all kinds of opposition, and therefore rela-
tively simple. The alderman of the Council of Rotterdam
and the Rotterdam Harbor Authority, a department of lo-
cal government, took the main decisions. The National
Department of Transport was responsible for the infra-
structure and was the sponsor of substantive investments
in the harbor. The first sea polder, the so-called
Maasvlakte I for industrial activities, was realized under
this regime. The Harbor Authority defined the need for
new industrial areas and national government paid for it.
Its interesting to see that the investment was based on the
assumption that the Maasvlakte I would be needed for
new chemical industry (blast furnace). When the polder
was ready for use, however, this need did not exist any-
more. This mismatch, however, did not lead to any gov-
ernmental crisis. And after a few years, fortunately, a new
activity appeared on the scene: container shipping. The
container trans-shipment activities were located on the
Maasvlakte.
In our case study, we present a reconstruction of the
decision-making processes in the last decades. We distin-
guish three rounds of decision making (for the method of
decision-making rounds, see Teisman 2000). The first round
of decision making, labeled Space and Environment
(ROM), started in the 1980s. The ROM arrangement can
be seen as one of the first efforts to organize interaction
between several public authorities that were responsible
for a specific territory. In this case, the area was the
Rijnmond region, which covers Rotterdam and 22 other
public and private organizations. In 1993, these 23 organi-
zations signed the ROM-Rijnmond Covenant. They agreed
to set up some 50 projects in order to realize a twofold
objective. It was their aim to stimulate economic growth
within this region and improve the living conditions of its
inhabitants. The Maasvlakte II project, possibly needed if
an ongoing economic expansion created a shortage of in-
dustrial areas, was also covered by the ROM covenant. In
several ways, this project, proposed by the Harbor Author-
ity, was a copy of the Maasvlakte I, not only technically,
but also in terms of governance.
Yes
No
Rising societal
expectations
Growing demands with
respect to the output of
decision making
Is complexity
accepted and
perceived as
desirable and
manageable?
Creation of
cooperative
governance
arrangement and
partnerships
Increased
interdependency will
be dealt with by way
of traditional
procedures: separation
of tasks, rebuilding
borderlines and
contracting-out
Increased interdepen-
dency; a need to
combine resources
Increased
complexity
and the
development
of networks
Scheme 1 Depiction of Societal Development to
Account for the Increased Call for Partnerships and
Alternative Responses to the New Situation
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Three Generations of Governance Arrangement
in Policy Making
To work out the details of this plan, a project organiza-
tion was set up in 1994. In December 1995, this organiza-
tion, whose main actors were the Rotterdam Municipal Port
Authority and members of the State Water Board, con-
cluded that the harbor would be faced with a considerable
lack of space for new economic activities in the near fu-
ture. The construction of a new polder in the sea
(Maasvlakte II, covering some 2,000 hectares) would be
needed. The organization advised defining the project as
one of major national importance in view of its significant
consequences in the field of economics, spatial planning,
and the environment. Thus, the administrative council for
the Rijnmond area concluded in December 1995 that a dis-
cussion would have to take place at the national level about
the problem of space in the Rotterdam port area. The Cabi-
net took up this proposal in the context of its views on
handling large-scale projects, which also led to widening
the scope of the project. From a project intended to ex-
pand the Rotterdam port area, it became a project intended
to explore the possibilities of expansion and the way these
would correspond to other objectives and uses of space.
In other words, a decision was made to widen the scope
of the project, both in terms of the number of actors in-
volved and the number of issues covered by the project.
This round of decision making became known as VERM—
VErkenning Ruimtebehoefte Mainport (exploring spatial
needs mainport). A lot of new actors were involved in this
process, especially citizens and local and regional groups.
The results of this round were handed over to the govern-
ment in the summer of 1997. Several months later, the na-
tional government decided to start a third round of deci-
sion making, the so-called PMR (Project Mainport
Rotterdam). This round can be characterized in different
ways, but the main theme we will deal with here is the
attempt made during this round to combine public deci-
sion making with private development.
Round I: A Public Partnership Approach:
Combining Physical Planning, Environmental
Policy, and Economic Development
The integrated, area-oriented policy was a new con-
cept formulated in the Fourth Report on Spatial Plan-
ning of the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and
Environmental Policy (December 1988). Due to all
kinds of implementation problems in both spatial plan-
ning and environmental policy, a search was begun for
new and more effective schemes (Tatenhove 1993, 137).
Keywords of the ROM approach—Ruimtelijke
Ordening en Milieu (Spatial Planning and Environmen-
tal Policy)—were regional orientation, integration, co-
operation, and feasibility (Tatenhove 1993, 145). In the
Netherlands, 11 ROM regions were selected (Ministerie
van VROM 1990, 14). One of the appealing new
schemes was the integrated area approach, which had
two main characteristics:
• Integration of content: an explicit effort to integrate spa-
tial and environmental policies. These two policy fields
had quite different characteristics. Several of the instru-
ments of environmental policy, however, were counter-
productive in terms of spatial planning.
• Administrative integration: an explicit effort to set up
some form of collaborative decision making between the
different layers of government.
The ROM scheme can be seen as one of the first efforts
in spatial planning to set up a dedicated scheme for deci-
sion making on an ad hoc basis. To kick off the ROM
project, an administrative agreement was drawn up between
all the authorities (and other parties) involved in decision
making in this specific area, in which the various partners
set out their goals and main principles.
In the next two years, a joint plan of action was devel-
oped (ROM project Rijnmond 1993), followed by a final
covenant (December 1993). Two ministers, one deputy
minister, the province, 15 mayors, and three regional eco-
nomic agencies signed this covenant. After this, the imple-
mentation of this joint undertaking was begun. The cov-
enant mentioned the realization of Maasvlakte II as one of
its projects, and a project organization responsible for its
implementation was set up. In 1995, this organization pre-
sented a report on Maasvlakte II. In 1996, the Cabinet de-
cided to start a separate decision-making process on
Mainport Rotterdam.
In 1997, ROM-Rijnmond was evaluated, and a new cov-
enant was signed. It is interesting to see that from that point
onward, the term “project” was replaced by the term “pro-
gram.” It had become clear to the people in
charge that ROM was not a project, and, for
this reason, it could not be managed as such
(ROM-Rijnmond, Drawing Up the Balance—
De Balans opgemaakt, November 1997). The
new covenant mentions the PMR as its first
and most important project under the head-
ing “Space for the Mainport.”
Scheme 2 Policy-Making Rounds on the Development of
Mainport Rotterdam
Three rounds
Period
Characteristics of the
governance scheme
Public partnership
approach (ROM)
1990–95
Joint decision making
between public
authorities
Popular participation
approach (VERM)
1996–97
Interaction between
governments, citizens
and societal groups
Public–private
partnership
approach (PMR)
1998–2001
Interaction between
governments and
private organizations
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Round II: Toward a Widening of Scope:
The Interactive Approach of Policy Making
The Cabinet’s decision in April 1996 started the so-called
VERM round. This round of decision making was based
on the proposal made by the Scientific Council for Gov-
ernment Policy (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het
Regeringsbeleid), formulated in its report “Decisions on
Large-Scale Projects.” The VERM round ran from April
1996 until the summer of 1997. It became one of the first
major infrastructure projects that was explicitly described
as a type of decision making that would be handled inter-
actively. The twofold objective stated in the ROM-
Rijnmond Covenant was adopted. VERM’s purpose was
to offer a solution to the possible lack of space in the
Rotterdam port area and to improve living conditions within
the surrounding environment. Thus, economic ambitions
would have to be combined with environmental goals.
To organize this open planning process, a new project
group was once again set up, in which officials from four
ministries took part (Traffic and Waterways, Economic Af-
fairs, Agriculture, Nature Control and Fisheries and Hous-
ing, Spatial Planning and Environmental Policy). In the pe-
riod from May 1996 to mid-1997, an interactive process was
initiated, in which the usefulness of and need for expansion
of the Rotterdam port area and possible alternatives were
discussed with many of the parties involved. During brain-
storming sessions with experts on content and process de-
velopment, sounding-board groups, and workshops, many
actors were consulted, and the nature of the spatial problem
and its possible solutions, also outside the Rotterdam area,
were discussed (Klijn and Koppenjan 2000).
The report drawn up by the project group, on the basis
of this interactive decision making, was published in mid-
1997. The findings of the project group were that lack of
space could be seen in three sectors in particular: contain-
ers, chemistry, and distribution. However, these data be-
came available only at a late stage of the process, so it did
not play a dominant role in the workshops, where discus-
sions were held with several of those involved. Basically,
there were three alternatives:
• The zero option: No expansion, because the economic
advantage had not been convincingly proved. Economic
development would have to focus on other (more envi-
ronmentally friendly) sectors.
• Expansion by increasing port activities within the exist-
ing area: New functions would have to be incorporated
into the existing space by means of restructuring. In ad-
dition, space would have to be made available in other
areas. This would make it possible to handle container
transport in Vlissingen/Terneuzen. Several regions indi-
cated they would have space to cope with the growth of
chemistry.
• Increasing port activities by expanding the port area:
Such expansion plans existed in several regions.
Maasvlakte II could be designed in a number of differ-
ent ways. A small polder could be constructed to handle
growth in the container sector. A larger polder could also
be constructed to cope with the lack of space in all sec-
tors. The general opinion in the workshops was that the
polder area should be kept as small as possible. There
was also a preference for northward expansion, which
would cause fewer harms to the natural environment than
expansion southward. The option of expanding into the
sea was not studied further.
After the results of VERM were handed over to the na-
tional government, the further preparation of the Cabinet
decision took place along the usual official channels. Dur-
ing this preparation, the findings of the VERM project
group were used only sporadically. The decision of the
Cabinet in 1997 was more in line with existing opinions at
the beginning of the interactive process than with the con-
tents of the VERM debates. Several characteristics of the
process contributed to this result:
• In contrast to the ROM round, no explicit attempts were
made to incorporate the interactive process into the
policy-making procedures of the national government.
• The activities of supporters of the Maasvlakte II solu-
tion were neither stopped nor incorporated into the
VERM process.
• Government had no experience with the new scheme
proposed by the Scientific Council for Government
Policy and had not developed a clear concept of the
implications of interactive decision making for exist-
ing procedures.
Round III: In Search of Private Financing
and Involvement
On June 14, 1997, the Dutch Cabinet decided to initiate
a new round of decision making. This decision was called
a project decision, in compliance with the Scientific Coun-
cil for Government Policy’s proposals. It was the official
conclusion of the VERM round, even though the Cabinet
did not decide to what extent a new polder would be nec-
essary. The third round was heavily embedded in the ex-
isting national procedures of decision making in the field
of spatial planning and environmental policy: the spatial
core decision procedure (PKB) combined with an envi-
ronmental impact study. For this reason, the Cabinet used
the term PKB+. In this round, the ambition to combine
economic development with upgrading spatial and envi-
ronmental qualities was consolidated (twofold goal).
At the same time, however, the Cabinet was urged by
Parliament to pay specific attention to the possibilities of
public–private collaboration (motion proposed by the
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Labour Party in Parliament). In practice, however, the pub-
lic authorities, more specifically the new project organiza-
tion on Mainport Rotterdam, took the initiative: PMR. This
project group consisted of representatives from the four
ministries, together with the Rotterdam Regional Author-
ity, the municipality of Rotterdam, the province of South-
Holland, and the Ministry of Finance. The last-named ac-
tor entered the Mainport arena because it was the initiator
of the Knowledge Center on Public Private Partnership.
Ten other municipalities involved in ROM, however, did
not participate in this scheme (see Mainport Development
Rotterdam Starting Memorandum—Startnotitie
Mainportontwikkeling Rotterdam 1997). A private-involve-
ment study project was set up in October 1998, in which a
consortium of several public and private parties explored
the possibility of private involvement in realizing parts of
the Mainport Rotterdam project.
An interim report indicated that it was important to in-
volve private parties at an early stage (On Board Together—
Samen aan Boord 1999). Three schemes were explored:
• Traditional contracting out: The national government
and other governments are involved in joint decision
making and specify the output they need, the optimal
scope of the project, and the kind of cooperation they
wish to establish with private parties. Following this, a
contracting-out scheme may be set up.
• The combination model: Governments and private par-
ties are involved in decision making at an early stage,
but still develop separate ways for public and private
decision making.
• The partnering model: Governments and private parties
set up a joint platform in which all parties participate on
a risk-bearing basis. Together, they specify the projects
needed for further development of Mainport Rotterdam,
and together they will be responsible for contracting out
parts of the plan.
All three models have been elaborated in the PMR pro-
cess (scheme 3). The PMR management gave preference
to the combination model. They began a kind of explor-
atory round, in which private parties could submit pro-
posals for projects that would be judged by their eco-
nomic and social merits. In the end, however, the gov-
ernment did not set up any of these more innovative mod-
els, but opted for the traditional approach instead. There
were several reasons for this course of action. First of all,
the municipality of Rotterdam, which owned the Harbor
Authority and thus was used to exploiting and control-
ling developments in the harbor to an important extent,
did not want to lose control of the financial revenues it
received from the harbor.
Furthermore, the state committee responsible for the
PKB+ procedure was not in favor of the early participa-
tion of private parties. Using formal arguments from pub-
lic law, it chose to stick to traditional procedures. This made
any form of partnership extremely difficult. Third, the en-
vironmental movement feared that environmental objec-
tives would be neglected in the case of a partnership
scheme. Solutions for the intensified use of industrial ar-
eas in the port (in terms of underground oil storage, more
stacking of containers, etc.) were likely to be rejected by
private parties. Thus, the environmental movement advo-
cated a more active position on the part of public actors
that would place more pressure on private actors to im-
prove living conditions in the surrounding environment.
Lessons Drawn From Three Generations of
Schemes in Search for Partnership
When analyzing the decision-making process regard-
ing Mainport Rotterdam so far, we may draw some inter-
esting conclusions on governance and partnership:
• Increased complexity of policy making is unmistakable
reality. Due to the emancipation of local and regional
governments, citizens, and all kinds of private partners,
the number of parties involved in decision making has
clearly increased.
• This complexity is not just due to the fact that many
actors are involved. It also has to do with the develop-
ment of different perceptions on the problem and pref-
erable solutions and strategies. National government
has tried to solve the question of the need and neces-
sity of Mainport development and a new polder by way
of the VERM debate. It is still, however, faced with the
Scheme 3 Three Forms of Private Involvement in Spatial-Development Projects
Variable
Role government
Process characteristics
Role private actor
Action
Partnering model
A joint public-private platform
specifies the projects needed
Joint principal position in relation to
parties who tender for parts of the
projects
Joint development by private and
public organizations
Joint schemes for production and
exploitation
Combination model
Global definition of governmental aims
Early tendering procedure choosing the
best private proposal even though a
definitive public decision making is not
available
Private proposal in interaction with
public decision making
Project realization by private
companies
Contracting out
Governments specify what is needed
Tendering procedure leading to
contracting out
Private production of specified project
Finished job handed over to
government
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ongoing debate about the advantages of the develop-
ment of the Mainport, the transition from Mainport to
brainport, and so on. Moreover, the government itself
is unable to take a clear position in this debate. Our
conclusion is that the Mainport Rotterdam case clearly
shows that the number of requirements for develop-
ment is constantly growing. It is for this reason that we
have formulated the twofold goal given above; more-
over, the specification of what should be done is un-
dergoing constant change.
• These constant alterations in the inputs and desired out-
puts of processes, in positive terms, one could say an
ongoing learning process, make it difficult to implement
a traditional contracting-out scheme (Klijn and Teisman
2000). From this it might be concluded that partnerships
are indeed called for. At the same time, however, we
may observe that governments are strongly dedicated to
their own procedures such as PKB+. In practice, this is
likely to lead to situations in which governments refrain
from partnerships, because sooner or later these schemes
will challenge the formal procedures (based on the cen-
trality of government rather than on joint undertakings).
• Despite all the rhetoric and debate about governance
and partnership, the policy making of the Mainport
Rotterdam is still rather traditional. Some forms of pub-
lic cooperation do exist, but they are not yet very pow-
erful. There has been some popular participation, but
these activities were too loosely coupled to existing—
and still rather dominant—political decision making.
And although public–private partnership schemes have
been investigated more intensively, in the end they were
not implemented.
Conclusion: Contradictions and
Possibilities
There have been repeated calls for a shift from a gov-
ernment to a governance approach in general and partner-
ships in particular. There are impressive arguments for this
shift. Governance could be the public answer to the rise of
network society. At the same time, however, practice shows
us that existing governmental organizations are not yet
capable of developing such partnership schemes in prac-
tice. Governance strategies, such as public–private part-
nerships, call for an exchange of information between ac-
tors and a willingness to look for solutions on a mutual
basis. Government does not act this way: It recognizes the
need for cooperation, but it does not take the consequences.
It is for this reason that ideas for public–private partner-
ship are, in practice, transformed into contracting-out
schemes. This last type of arrangement meets the need for
clear goals defined by government and politicians, clear
product specifications, and clear rules for tendering.
The decision-making process of Mainport Rotterdam
indicates how difficult it is to establish a partnership, in
spite of all the sincere efforts made by public and private
officials. Public actors want to retain their primacy within
the process. As long as this is the case, private partners
will not bring in their knowledge and their efforts. This is
a serious obstacle to achieving synergy and finding new
solutions. It certainly cannot be precluded that the prob-
lems with the Maasvlakte I (no users and an extensive use)
will by copied again.
Future Possibilities
In order to realize the full potential of governance ar-
rangements and public–private partnership, a long road is
still ahead. We are dedicated to our traditional representa-
tive democracy, and therefore on our guard with respect to
more complex governance arrangements. We cherish the
different roles of public and private sector, and therefore
create clear borders.
The exploration of how to create new governance ar-
rangements, more mature forms of popular participation,
and effective public–private partnerships has only just be-
gun. In order to understand the abilities of and problems
with governance arrangements, scholars in public admin-
istration first should shift from a focus on governmental
organizations and the internal procedures to a focus on the
interorganizational processes that shape a growing amount
of public policy. The importance of process analyses has
already been recognized in business administration (Ham-
mer and Champy 1994; Short and Venkatraman 1992;
Riggins and Mukhopadhayay 1994). It seems necessary to
us that public administration also embraces
interorganizational process as an important object for theo-
rizing. From these new theories on governance, we can
deal with the interesting dilemma of achieving new types
of partnership in order to improve the quality of policy
output and being accountable at the same time. In the mean-
time, governments should ask themselves whether it would
be fruitful to become more dedicated to interorganizational
processes and less to their own internal procedures.
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